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RECENT DECISIONS
"nonsigner" clause contravenes the due process clause of the Ohio Bill
of Rights, by arbitrarily denying a seller the privilege of disposing of his
property on terms of his own choosing.' 5 Finally, it delegates legisla-
tive power and discretion to private persons. Choosing to face the issue
squarely, in disregard of the time-honored tenet that a case shall be dis-
posed of, if possible, on other than constitutional grounds, the Court ig-
nored the dissenting contention of Justice Taft that the third party con-
tract, by which appellant allegedly was bound, was void for lack of
consideration.
In Nebbia v. New York'0 the Supreme Court of the United States
declared that the function of the courts in the application of the due
process clause is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindi-
cate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental
authority, or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory. Before deciding
the constitutionality of the statute in that case, the Supreme Court
launched into an exhaustive analysis of the related economics of produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption of the product involved, in order to
evaluate properly whether or not the statute was arbitrary.
Although the Ohio Court's ruling seems to be in harmony with pre-
vailing public sentiment, a more thorough analysis of the economic im-
plications, and an explanation thereof, should have been included in the
decision in order to elucidate the reasons for holding the Fair Trade Act
to be an unreasonable exercise of the state police power.
LYMAN H. TREADWAY
SALES - EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Plaintiff purchased from a retailer a home permanent kit which the
defendant manufacturer, in its nationwide advertising, represented as safe
and gentle. After using the product in accordance with directions, the
plaintiff lost her hair. In her petition plaintiff pleaded three causes of
action, viz., negligence, express warranty, and implied warranty.
The trial court sustained the defendanes demurrer to the latter two
causes of action due to the absence of privity of contract. Though she
could have continued to plead in the negligence action,' plaintiff de-
clined to plead further, and allowed judgment to go against her. The
Uncontrolled price cutting is a two-edged sword; it is a means of
crushing the small rival by the great trusts to the end that complete monop-
oly may be acquired to the disadvantage of the public....
: OHIo CONST. art. I, § 1. "All men... have certain inalienable rights, among
which are those of... acquiring, possessing, and protecting property .. "
10 291 U.S. 502 (1934). It was contended that because the Milk Control Law of
New York purposed to control prices, it denied due process.
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court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling as to implied warranty,
but reversed the ruling with respect to express warranty. The Ohio Su-
preme Court, by a unanimous decision, affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether privity of contract
was a prerequisite to an action based on either express or implied war-
ranty. The court held that privity was not necessary to maintain an ac-
tion based on express warranty, although it was a requisite to an action
based on implied warranty.2 The basis of the distinction is the way in
which each is created. An express warranty is created by an affirmation
or promise which must be explicitly stated,3 while an implied warranty
is one which the law derives by inference from a factual situation.m4 Thus,
there can be an express warranty without a contract.5
Historically, express warranty existed at least 100 years -before the
action of assumpsit,6 and it was initially a tort action in the nature of
deceit. The main distinction between warranty and deceit is the element
of swenter. An action for breach of warranty will lie merely if some fact
is not as warranted, while an action for deceit requires the seller to know
that the facts are not as he says they are.7
The case of Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.8 might be a rec-
ognition of modern merchandising methods, and an attempt to modern-
ize the archaic provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. Sections 12 through
16 of the Uniform Sales Act9 are essentially a codification of the com-
mon law. These sections were designed for an economy which had not
yet conceived of supermarkets and mass media of communications.' 0 In
1MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Liability for negli-
gence without privity of contract); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1939).
'Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
8Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); PROSSER,
TORTS § 83 (2d ed. 1955). See OHIO REv. CODE § 1315.13; UNIFORM SALES
ACT § 12; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313.
'Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 269 P.2d 1041 (1954); PROSSER,
TORTS § 83 (2d ed. 1955). See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1315.14 and 1315.16; UNI-
FORM SALES ACT § 15; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
'Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); PROSSER,
TORTS §§ 83 and 86 (2d ed. 1955); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195-98, 201, 244,
24 4a (rev. ed. 1948). But see, 1 WILLISTON, SALES §5 199-200 (Some jurisdic-
tions require privity of contract).
'Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1888).
7PROSSER, TORTS § 86 (2d ed. 1955); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 198 (rev. ed.
1948); cf. 1 id. § 202.
'167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
9 OHIO REv. CODE 55 1315.13-.14 (defining implied and express warranty).
10 Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C. L
REv. 551, 557-58 (1941).
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an era when the artisan sold his products directly to the consumer it was
difficult to visualize a situation where there could be a warranty without
privity of contract. However, modern marketing methods, and a recog-
nition of the ways in which modern advertising influences a consumer
to purchase items without the recommendation of a retailer, justifies the
finding of an express warranty if a misrepresentation of the product's
qualities has been made in the advertising."L Modern merchandising
methods have even brought forth strong arguments in favor of holding
the manufacturer liable to the remote vendee for an implied warranty of
fitness. Pursuing this view further it has been suggested that the manu-
facturer 'be made an insurer of his product for the protection of the con-
suming public. 2
By admitting the existence of an express warranty, the Ohio Supreme
Court has eliminated the need for fictions, used in many jurisdictions to
achieve a similar result, due to the prevailing belief that privity of con-
tract is necessary to maintain an action based on warranty. The fictions
indulged in are: (1) the warranty runs with the chattel,' 3 (2) the con-
sumer is a third party beneficiary of the original contract between the
manufacturer and the distributor,14 (3) there is a unilateral contract be-
tween the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer,15 and (4) the re-
tailer is an agent of the manufacturer.16
Whether the court could have reached the same conclusion by hold-
ing cosmetics to be included within the purview of the Pure Food and
'Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) (Privity of con-
tract not needed since representations in catalogue are a warranty). Accord, Mannsz
v. MacWhyte, 155 F.2d 445, 449-50 (3d Cir. 1946); Canton Provision Co. v.
Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935); Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St.
291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938). See also Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Per-
sons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L REv. 134 (1937). Contra,
Jordon v. Bouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505, 93 N.E.2d 49 (1949) (Privity of contract
required in spite of express warranty on cans of anti-freeze); Rachin v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938) (Privity of contract necessary
even where ultimate consumer relies on representations made by the manufacturer
in advertisements).
"PROSsER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955). See 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 24 4a (rev.
ed. 1948); Note, Liability of the Manufacturer to the Ultimate Consumer for Breach
of Warranty in Ohio, 7 WEST. RES. L. REV. 94 (1955).
' Chenault v. Houston Coca Cola Bottling Co., 151 Miss. 366, 118 So. 177 (1928).
"Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
'" Cf., Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q. B. 256 (1893) (Concept of a general
offer to the public regarding the qualities of a product); Spruill, Privity of Contract
as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C. L Rev. 551, 553-54 (1941).
"Accord, Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932).
See also Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939);
PROSSER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
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Drug Act' 7 is no longer important. Cosmetics have been expressly in-
duded in the Act by a 1957 amendment.' 8 The amendment provides
that a cosmetic is any substance which is to be applied to a human body
for purposes of beautifying the body. The express inclusion of cosmetics
in the Pure Food and Drug Act means that any defect or impurity will
be viewed as negligence per se,19 as has been done in regard to items
previously included under this act.
As a result of the decision in the principal case the injured consumer
in Ohio has a remedy against the remote manufacturer, while the effec-
tiveness of lack of privity as a manufacturer's defense has been greatly
limited2 0
MARVIN SICHEMAN
2
7 OHIO REv. CODE § 3715.01.
'Ibid., effective Sept. 13, 1957.
19PRossER, TORTs § 34 (2d ed. 1055) (Any unexcused violation of a statute in-
tended to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included is negligence
in itself.).
' Compare Welsh v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957); Wood v.
General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953), with Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). See also, (Ohio
Ct. App. 1958) Symposium, Strict Liability of Manufaactrers, 24 TENN. L REv.
923 (1957).
[September
